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Abstract 
 
The present working paper assesses the institutional factors which favoured, and 
those that hindered, the rise of populism, in order to identify the institutional 
arrangements which can be most effective to prevent populist politics to consolidate. 
Also, the paper seeks to evaluate which characteristics of the European project have 
facilitated the spread of populism in Europe. The main claim of this work is that to 
create a barrier to the spread of populism in Europe, it is necessary to enhance the 
democratic quality of European democracies. This should be done in two ways. On 
the one hand, the constitutional dimension of democracy shall be protected by 
introducing more counterweights between powers and a well-designed procedure for 
constitutional revision. On the other hand, correctives should be introduced to 
enhance the representativeness of the democratic institutions and the citizens 
participation in decision-making processes.
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Introduction 
 
The goal of the research summarised in this working paper was to identify which institutional 
arrangements and procedures have favoured the spread of populism in Europe. Collaterally, the 
research also aimed at singling out the institutional barriers to populism. The present work has 
been drafted taking into account the comments and suggestions received by the partners in the 
DEMOS Project, in particular the Hungarian Academy of Legal Sciences and the University of 
Copenhagen and it is divided in four main sections.  
The First Section presents the three strains of the research: populism v. constitutional 
democracy; populism v. representative democracy; populism and the European Union. 
Section 2 contains the questionnaire that has been elaborated by the DEMOS partners to support 
the normative analysis with quantitative data. 
Section 3 formulates some policy recommendations based both on the results of the normative 
analysis and the reports submitted by national experts. 
Section 4 illustrates the further developments of the research in the DEMOS project. 
Annex I to this deliverable contains the text of the questionnaire.  
Finally, for the sake of transparency, some information concerning the people participating in 
the research and the working procedure are in order. The research within this subtask, and the 
drafting of the questionnaire, have been mainly carried out by three Partners: the University of 
Barcelona, leader of the subtask, the University of Copenhagen, and the Centre for Social 
Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The people actually involved in the research 
were: Prof. Jose Maria Castella and Dr. Marco Antonio Simonelli (UB); Prof. Helle Krunke 
and Dr. Sune Klinge (UCPH); Prof. Zoltán Szente; Dr. Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz and Dr. Emese 
Szilágyi. Besides, Prof. Dimitri Sotiropoulos of the University of Athens (ELIAMEP) provided 
inputs and suggestions concerning the general framework of the research.  The research work 
started in April 2019, when the UB team drafted a first version of the report that was circulated 
amongst the partners. Then, in June 2019 a kick-off meeting, hosted by Chair of the Scientific 
Board of Demos, Prof. Tania Groppi, was held in Siena. During the meeting, the research for 
this report was discussed, and researchers proceeded with further dividing tasks. Other two 
meetings were held in Barcelona, in December 2019, to discuss the content of the report and 
further research within the DEMOS project. 
 
1. Populism and contemporary democracy. A controversial relationship 
 
The preliminary research work that has been carried out is a far-reaching review of the existing 
literature on the relationship between populism and contemporary democracy. In this regard, a 
caveat is in order. The definition of populism adopted in this working paper focuses only on 
one of its dimensions, i.e. on its relationship with the institutions of constitutional democracy. 
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This section is further subdivided in three subsections. Subsection 1 analyses the relationship 
between populism and representative democracy. Subsection 2 deals with the impact of populist 
politics on the institutions of constitutional democracy. Subsection 3 assesses the role EU 
institutions have played and may play in countering the spread of populist politics.  
1.1 Populism and constitutional pluralistic democracy  
 
In populist narrative, the concept of democratic legitimacy takes prevalence over the principle 
of legality, i.e. the popular will is conceived as legibus soluta. Evidently, such a claim 
undermines the very core of the rule of law state. The ‘We, the People’ which opens the 
Preamble to the US Constitution of 1787 enshrines the idea that the source of legitimacy of the 
whole legal order is to be found in the popular will, which by establishing the separation of 
powers and by delegating the government to representatives ultimately limits itself. However, 
as observed by Mounk, this expression has been transformed by the populist narrative in ‘We 
are the people’, a slogan used by the German far-right political movement Pegida (Patriotische 
Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Patriotic Europeans Against the 
Islamisation of the Occident)) in the street rallies against German immigration policy in 2014 
and 2015 (Mounk 2018). Simply by inverting the words’ order, the message conveys a 
completely different meaning: the protesters pretend to speak in the name of every citizen, and 
they do not accept any limit to their will.  
Nonetheless, the main idea that populist parties advance, namely to enhance the democratic 
legitimacy of the whole constitutional system is, from a theoretical point of view, a legitimate 
claim. Populism, in fact, may constitute ‘an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic 
liberalism’(Mudde 2015, Mudde – Rovira 2013), and rather than an attack on constitutional 
democracy, it is a corrective to a deficit thereof. To this regard, Pinelli observed that the 
impressive growth, in contemporary constitutional democracies, of counter-majoritarian 
institutions has caused the space reserved to politics - and thus to the people - to shrink (Pinelli 
2011), evidencing a problem about the democratic legitimacy of contemporary democracies, 
which populist leaders have exploited. Be that as it may, populist parties assert the necessity to 
re-legitimate the whole constitutional legal system, through a process of constitutional revision 
when they have the required majority to pass it. Otherwise, they tend to a delegitimate the 
Constitution and the compromise at its origin, or to amend laws and change the composition of 
the Constitutional Court to loosen down the limits to its actions. Different from this is the 
enlarging of the space reserved to citizens’ participation (Castellà 2018), as it happened, 
amongst others, in Ireland and Italy.  
In general terms, indeed, the tension between democracy and constitutionalism is frequently 
unavoidable. And, in the political agenda of populist parties, this tension is often exacerbated. 
Populist elected representatives seem more reluctant to accept to be subject to the laws and 
Constitution. They invoke their electoral legitimacy to oppose limits imposed by norms and 
enforced by the judiciary. This produces two main consequences. Firstly, once in power 
populist seek to destroy the independence of the judiciary, by approving substantive reforms 
especially as regards disciplinary regimes and appointments of judicial councils’ members and 
Copyright Castellà and Simonelli. (2019). 
6 
judges1. Secondly, if they obtain the necessary majority, they transform the national constitution 
into an instrument of everyday politics, thus nullifying its content, a phenomenon that has been 
referred to as abusive constitutionalism, i.e. a situation in which the governing majorities make 
a formally legal recourse to the mechanisms of constitutional revision to erode the democratic 
order (Landau 2012). Once constitutional limits are overcome, indeed, it is easier to block the 
mechanisms that allow for the alternance in power: changes to the electoral law; the removal 
of limits to presidential mandates and reduction of the space for public debate (s.c. shrinking 
spaces), are all example a process that has been called of democratic erosion (Ginsburg and Huq 
2018). All in all, it can be held that the flaws in the contemporary constitutional democracy at 
which populists point out are not imaginary. Yet, the practical solutions they provide to redress 
the suboptimal level of democratic legitimacy in contemporary democracy results to severely 
undermine the very foundations of the rule of law state. The questionnaire tries to assess 
whether these processes are already happening in EU Member States (Q4, Q5, Q6), and whether 
this resulted in an alteration of the balance between the three branches of power (Q 7). 
 
1.2 How populism affects the representative dimension of contemporary 
democracies 
 
Populism rejects the very foundation of representative democracy: populist parties pretend to 
be linked directly with the people, without intermediaries and they privilege rapid governmental 
decision making over the centrality of the parliament, which is seen as an unnecessary 
intermediary institution protecting the interests of the elites. Also, in the ideas of populist 
parties, the only genuine form of democracy is direct democracy, hence they tend to advocate 
for referenda in the most important matters of the political agenda, e.g. EU membership. As 
Isaiah Berlin has observed, after a first phase in which the people are continuously interrogated 
with referenda about his will, there is a second phase in which the populist leader affirms to 
know the will of his people without the need of consulting him. (Berlin, 1968) 
Despite a generalised tendency to consider representative democracy incompatible with 
populism, some scholars have argued that without representative democracy there cannot be 
populism. (Müller, 2017). First of all, populist parties do participate in elections with the goal 
of obtaining representatives. To this regard, one should distinguish populism with demagogy. 
Whilst the latter is classically considered as a degeneration of democracy, where the people 
have an unlimited power that ultimately leads to tyranny, populism born and operates within 
the boundaries of representative democracy. Indeed, populist parties do not want to overcome 
representative democracy, their ambition is rather to be the sole representative of the popular 
will. Of course, in order to fulfil such an ambition they propose to dismantle some of the 
features of representative democracy, like the prohibition of imperative mandate, e.g. the 
proposal of the Italian 5 Star Movement supported by the Northern League, and to introduce a 
more stringent control over representatives for example by introducing the institute of recall. In 
contemporary European democracies, we observe two tendencies, partially contradictory, of 
 
1See: Polish Report, 13-14; Hungarian Report, 21-23. 
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populist parties concerning the representative dimension. On the one hand, they advocate for 
the introduction of new instruments of participative and direct democracy as a counter-power 
to traditional representative institutions, and especially the parliament. On the other hand, 
however, populists do want to give more power to parliaments in relation to the oversight of 
independent authorities and in the appointment of members of the judiciary.  
In conclusion, the main critical aspects that were identified in the relationship between 
populism and representative democracy are essentially two. The first one is the introduction of 
more stringent forms of control of representatives by the people, via the abolition of the 
prohibition of imperative mandate or the institute of recall. The second one is a more intense 
use of instruments of direct democracy, above all the referenda, at the expense of the normal 
decision-making procedure, i.e. the parliamentary one. Both these aspects, therefore, there have 
been investigated through specific questions contained in the questionnaire (see in particular 
Q1 and Q8).  
 
1.3. The European Union and the spread of populism in Europe 
 
Article 2 TEU affirms that ‘[t]he Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities’. Therefore, it is evident that the processes described above, 
happening in EU Member States, concern also the European Union. This is why in this subtask, 
the research has been conducted also on the role of EU institutional context in the spread of 
populism in Europe.  
Since the beginning of the XXI century, the EU is suffering from a substantial legitimacy crisis.2 
Its structural lack of democratic legitimacy, combined with the difficulties in the management 
of the sovereign debt crisis, has generated anti-European sentiments, making the EU the 
favourite target of the populist narrative (Pinelli, 2011). These anti-European sentiments, which 
populist parties have channelled into Euroscepticism, call for the creation of a European public 
sphere. As evidenced by Habermas in its seminal essay ‘Why Europe needs a Constitution’ 
(2001), the lack of opportunities to participate in the European decision making progress is in 
fact a primary cause of distrust towards the EU institutions. 
The main path, to enhance the EU’ democratic legitimacy, thus reconnecting the EU institutions 
to the citizens and giving substance to Article 10 TEU, would be to reshape the role of the 
European Parliament (‘the EP’). To this regard, it is worth noting that in the two major crises 
of the last ten years, the sovereign debt crisis and the rule of law one, the EP stimuli have been 
substantially ignored by the Member States sitting in the Council. During the former, the EP 
had virtually no role (Fasone, 2014), as all the most significant decisions were taken outside 
the EU legal framework, above all the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism. In 
 
2In general on the issue of the EU democratic deficit and how to reduce it see: B. Pérez de las Heras (ed.), 
Democratic Legitimacy in the European Union and Global Governance: Building a European Demos, 
Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016. 
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the rule of law crisis, the main contribution the EP gave, has been to trigger the Article 7 TEU 
procedure against Hungary. Yet, the rules of procedure for the hearings referred to in Article 
7(1) TEU, approved by the Council in July 2019, do not allow the EP to take part in these 
hearings, even in the case where is the EP formulated the reasoned proposal, thus depriving the 
whole procedure of a significant input of democratic legitimacy. Another case is in point to 
show the marginalisation of the EP’s position is the election of the new Commission President. 
The informal procedure followed for the election of Juncker in 2014, known as spitzenkandidat, 
according to which the European Council appoints as Commission President the candidate 
indicated by the party that gathered most votes in the EP election, was indeed abandoned. 
Instead, the appointment of President Van der Leyen has been the result of lengthy negotiations 
conducted between Member States only, which the EP had to ratify.  
All in all, the European Parliament, being the institution through which European citizens are 
directly represented at the Union level, should play a more central role in European politics. 
The fact that the for the first time in history the overall turnout for the EP elections rose, most 
notably in Hungary and Poland, attests that the EU is still perceived, even in populist-ruled 
Member States, as part of a democratic endeavour. But, if Member States continue to relegate 
the EP to a subordinate position, it will be just too easy for populist parties to depict the EU as 
an elite-driven project. 
Finally, another way to give substance to Article 10(3) TEU, which reads ‘[e]very citizen shall 
have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union’, is to promote the use of the 
European Citizens Initiative. This instrument, representing a way for direct engagement of 
citizens in the decision-making process, may constitute a way to reduce the EU’s democratic 
deficit and to push back anti-Europeans sentiments. 
 
On another note, one should also consider which policy sector in which the EU has a 
competence to act, constitute a battlefield on which populist parties are challenging the 
legitimacy of the European Union. One is without doubt migration. To this regard, is possible 
to cite many examples, but the most symptomatic is probably that of Hungary. Faced with a 
Council decision imposing the relocation of refugees amongst EU Member States, 3  the 
Hungarian government outrightly refused to accept even one single refugee. If the Decision 
was adopted invoking the principle of solidarity and of fair sharing of responsibility amongst 
Member States, Prime Minister Orban claimed that the quota system envisaged by the Council 
Decision ‘redraw[s] Hungary's and Europe's ethnic, cultural and religious identity, which no 
EU organ has the right to do’4 and therefore called a referendum in which the Hungarian 
population had to decide whether or not to accept the relocation plan. Unsurprisingly, the 
referendum turned out to be a major success for Orban: albeit with a turnout of only 44%, 98% 
of the voters declared to be contrary to the mandatory relocation plan. This example shows that 
the EU’s attempts to impose a liberal view about immigration, are inevitably doomed to fail. 
 
3 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. 
4  See: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/hungary/12171895/Hungary-to-hold-referendum-
on-whether-to-accept-EU-migrant-quotas.html last accessed 20 October 2019. 
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The closure of borders is clearly perceived as beneficial by the Hungarian population and the 
government can exploit such a feeling by calling an election or a referendum asking voters to 
choose between European values and Hungarian ones. In a nutshell, the possibilities for 
intervention in the domestic political arena by the EU institutions should be limited. More 
specifically, any interference need to be based on sound legal arguments rather than on value-
laden ones (von Bogdandy, 2019). This consideration is reflected in the composition of the 
questionnaire that, in the part dedicated to the European Union (Qs 9, 10 and 11), is exclusively 
focused on the Member States perspective and seek to identify the major causes of conflicts. 
 
2. The questionnaire. Structure and goals  
 
The purpose to conduct a survey was twofold. On the one hand, it helped the researchers to 
identify the main lines of actions followed by populist politics, at the same time identifying the 
institutional setups that promote or hinder populism, on the other hand, it constitutes a 
validation of the results of the normative analysis. Also, the answers to the questionnaire will 
constitute the basis for further research work to be carried in later stages of the Demos project.  
The decision to distribute the questionnaire amongst the 28 EU Member States was taken in 
light of several considerations. The first is that the 28 EU Member States constitute a 
sufficiently homogenous pool of countries, susceptible to being analysed with a single 
framework. Any other selection would have been arbitrary, or would have presented problems 
of consistency5. Secondly, one of the project’s main goals is exactly to evaluate the role and 
impact of EU institutions on populism; in this light, the pool’s composition is just 
consequential.  
The temporal scope of the questionnaire is limited to relevant changes happened in the last ten 
years. This delimitation allowed national experts to focus on the most relevant transformations 
happened in the last decade, which was characterised by the emergence of populist parties 
throughout Europe. A common root of this sudden growth of populism in Europe is can be 
identified in the sovereign debt crisis that shook Europe in 2008 (C. Procentese 2018), a growth 
that was subsequently fuelled by the 2015 refugees’ crisis. Indeed, albeit the existence of a link 
between populism and crisis is still a debated issue (M. D. Poli 2016, Knight 1998), empirical 
data confirms that the electoral breakthroughs of Europe’s major populist parties, with the 
possible exception of the French ‘Front National’, all happened in the last decade.6 
 
The questionnaire is divided into four parts, each with a different objective.  
 
 
5 The main alternative proposal was to enlarge the focus to the Council of Europe Member States. However, 
amongst this pool, there are fully-fledged authoritarian States such as Azerbaijan and Russia for which render 
any analysis pointless.  
6As a matter of fact, only in the last decade populist parties entered national governments, first in Hungary and 
subsequently in Czechia, Slovakia, Poland and most recently Italy. 
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The first two parts of the questionnaire are the ones on which this working paper is mainly 
based. The first part seeks to trace back the institutional transformations that happened in the 
last ten years in the EU Member States. More specifically, this part aims at evaluating the 
impact of populism on constitutional democracy. These questions are based on two 
presumptions. One is that populist parties tend to weaken the institutional guarantees of 
constitutional democracy such as, above all, the rigidity of the constitution and the separation 
of powers. The other is that once entered the government, populists also tend to consolidate 
their grasp on power by changing the ‘rules of the game’, e.g. the electoral law and the overall 
system of checks and balances. 
The second part contains questions focusing on the effects of populist politics on representative, 
direct and participative democracy. The questions ask the respondent to investigate the use of 
referenda, the relationship with NGOs’ and the status and positions of political parties in the 
legal order.  
The third part seeks information about the stance of national populist parties towards the 
European Union and how this affects the posture of national governments and constitutional 
courts. The answers to this part will be used also in the framework of WP 5.4 (Populism and 
the European Union: major fields of policy conflicts). This part of the questionnaire wants to 
examine what populist parties proposed, both at national level and in the European Parliament, 
in relation to the EU’s migration policy and the Eurozone reform, and what responses were 
given to these challenges by the governments.  
The last part of the questionnaire moves from the assumption that even in countries where 
populist parties have not come to power, populist politics have an impact in proceedings before 
administrative and judicial authorities, and to evaluate whether in EU Member States there have 
been cases of ‘judicial populism’, especially in the case-law of constitutional courts. Also, 
another question focuses on pointing out the constitutional guarantees which have been most 
effective in resisting or repealing populist challenges or, alternatively, which constitutional 
institutions/policies/procedures have been successfully used in the EU Member States to 
strengthen liberal constitutionalism. 
At the date 30 April 2020, 21 of out 28 national reports have been submitted for analysis to the 
Demos partners. The national reporters have been selected upon indication of the Demos 
partners. Preference has been given to constitutional law scholars or political scientist with a 
strong research focus on populist phenomena. Each national reporter has been chosen having 
regard to his deep knowledge of the national legal system concerned. Hereafter, the names and 
affiliation of the reporters that have insofar submitted the report:  
 
1) Austria, Prof. Konrad Lachmayer, Sigmund Freud University Vienna  
2)Belgium: Prof. Marc Verdussen, UCL Louvain 
3)Croatia: Prof. Djordje Gardasevic, University of Zagreb  
4)Czechia: Dr. Vlastimil Havlík, Masaryk University Brno 
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5)Denmark: Prof. Helle Krunke and Dr. Sune Klinge, University of Copenhagen 
6)France: Prof. Bertrand Mathieu, University of Paris I (Panthéon - Sorbonne)  
7)Estonia: Mr. Vadim Poleshchuk, Legal Information Centre for Human Rights 
8)Germany: Prof. Lando Kirchmair, University of Munich 
9)Greece: Prof. Dimitri Sotiropoulos, University of Athens 
10)Hungary: Hungarian Academy of Legal Sciences  
11)Ireland: Eoin Carolan, University College Dublin 
12)Italy: Dr. Marco Antonio Simonelli, University of Barcelona 
13)Latvia: Inese Freimane, Riga Graduate School of Law 
14)Lithuania: Prof. Jurgita Pauzaité-Kulvinskiené, Law Institute of Lithuania  
15)Poland: Prof. Miroslaw Granat, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University, Warsaw. Former 
Judge at the Polish Constitutional Court (2007-2016) 
16)Portugal: Dr. Teresa Violante, Max Planck Institute Heidelberg 
17)Romania: Prof. Simina Tanasescu, Bucharest University  
18)Slovakia: Mr. Simon Drugda, PhD Candidate, University of Copenhagen 
19)Spain: Prof. Jose Maria Castellà Andreu, University of Barcelona 
20)Sweden: Prof. Henrik Wanander, Ms. Lovisa Häckner Posse, Ms. Lisa Kerker, Dr. Vilhelm 
Persson, Lund University  
21)United Kingdom: Prof. Merris Amos, Queen Mary University London 
 
 
 
3. Preliminary findings and policy recommendations  
 
Taking into account the results of the analytical research and the reports received from national 
experts, we have identified some of the institutes and procedures which may be more effective 
in preventing a rise of populist policies, and it is thus possible to formulate some policy 
recommendations: 
Copyright Castellà and Simonelli. (2019). 
12 
1) Introduce more counterweights between powers. To this contributes, first, the 
introduction of limits to the number of presidential mandates in presidential or semi-
presidential systems has proved to be an effective way of limiting power: by temporarily 
limiting power, powers are rebalanced. Also, in parliamentary systems, this could be an 
effective solution despite the many objections7. The Constitution is the right place to 
provide for this element that modifies the form of government at the national level. 
Recently the Venice Commission has addressed the question of the legitimacy of 
imposing limits on the presidential mandates and other public authorities (subnational 
and local level, MPs) and whether they violate the right of participation of the elected 
and electors. In the opinion of the Venice Commission, unlimited mandates end up 
affecting constitutional democracy itself: ‘Term limits aim to protect a democracy from 
becoming a de facto dictatorship. Furthermore, term limits may strengthen a democratic 
society, as they impose the logic of political transition as a predictable event in public 
affairs. They can be important mechanisms to safeguard against “winner-take-all 
politics.” They also keep alive the opposition parties ’hope of gaining power in the near 
future through institutionalized procedures, with little incentive to seize power in a 
coup. Term limits, therefore, aim to protect human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law, which are legitimate aims within the meaning of international standards.8’ 
 
2) another tool that can effectively protect constitutional democracy against populist 
politics is a well-designed procedure for constitutional revision. In particular, the 
existence of eternity clauses and scrutiny by constitutional courts on the observance of 
the reform procedure is a valuable option chosen by some countries, e.g. Article 79(3) 
of the German Grundgesetz, to protect the core values of the Constitution. Also is 
particularly preferred, the provision of a super-majority requirement in parliament to 
pass a constitutional amendment: in this way, indeed, obtaining a majority of 
government, would not be sufficient to amend the constitution (as happened in Poland 
with the government led by the Law and Justice party). The determining factor is to 
reach a broad parliamentary consensus, a requirement that cannot be replaced by a 
referendum of ratification of the reform, as the Venice Commission has warned9, as it 
could become an instrument in the hands of the president to move it forward. The 
referendum is an additional element of guarantee, but, being an expression of 
majoritarian democracy, it cannot be enough for the approval of constitutional reform. 
The alteration of these procedures, basically through the addition of new requirements 
as an advisory referendum at the beginning of the reform process introduces a distortion 
that can be used by populism. 
 
7In Spain and Italy limits to re-election are present at subnational level (Autonomous Communities of Castilla La 
Mancha, Extremadura and Castilla y León in Spain, and all regions and municipalities in Italy). 
8See: CDL-AD(2018)010-e Report on Term of Limits - Part I - Presidents, adopted by the Venice Commission at 
its 114th Plenary Session, Venice, 16-17 March 2018, 93. See also: J.M. Castellà Andreu, “Estudio preliminar” a 
Comisión de Venecia, Informe sobre los límites a la reelección. Parte I. Presidentes, Centro de Estudios 
Constitucionales y Tribunal Constitucional, Perú, 2018. 
9See: CDL-AD(2010)001-e Report on Constitutional Amendment adopted by the Venice Commission at its 81st 
Plenary Session, Venice, 11-12 December 2009. 
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3) with regards to the regulation of political parties, legislation should provide stronger 
guarantees for their effective democratic functioning. A paradigmatic example of how 
the lack of regulation of political parties or a very general or open regulation may 
become harmful for democratic quality are the cases of Italy, and Spain. Albeit the both 
the Italian and Spanish Constitutions, at Article 49 and 6 respectively, provides that 
political parties should follow a ‘democratic method’, the regulation of political parties 
in Italy is virtually non-existent (Bonfiglio 2016), whilst in Spain is contained in an 
organic law (6/2002) which only gives a general discipline (Virgala, 2015). To 
aggravate the lack of internal democracy in the functioning of political parties, the 
Italian and Spanish electoral laws both provide for ‘blocked lists’ that are formed by 
party leaders and within which the voter had no choice whatsoever.10 
 
4) Concerning electoral systems, there is no clear indication on whether proportional or 
majoritarian systems may be most effective in containing the effects of populist politics. 
At first glance, it may appear that majoritarian systems may be more effective in holding 
back the advancement of populist parties. Two examples can be provided to that extent. 
First, in the United Kingdom, the electoral law, which provides for a majoritarian first-
past-the-post electoral system (i.e. candidates run in single-seat districts), has 
effectively prevented the far-right populist UK Independence Party (UKIP) from 
transforming its electoral success into seats in the House of Commons. A similar 
situation happened in France, which also has a majoritarian system based on a two-
round runoff voting for both the election of the President of Republic and the National 
Assembly. In 2017, Marine Le Pen, leader of the Rassemblement National (RN), a far-
right populist party, notwithstanding having obtained as much as 10 million votes in the 
runoff for the presidential post, only won eight seats in the following general election. 
Conversely, given that proportional systems favour small parties, as populist ones tend 
to be, it may be held that a proportional electoral system may ultimately favour them. 
Yet, evidence coming from countries with proportional systems offer a different picture. 
In the Netherlands, for example, the far-right populist party Party for Freedom (Partij 
voor de Vrijheid, PVV) was the second most voted for party in the 2017 general 
election. Yet all the mainstream political parties, already before the elections, were 
committed to leaving the PVV outside of any governing coalition, as in fact happened. 
Also, in Germany the far-right party Alternative for Germany (Alternative Fur 
Deutschland, AFD), obtained some 13.6% of the popular vote but was left out of the 
governing coalition.However, a non-proportional system, especially if based on a 
majority bonus, may help populist parties to ascend to government. For instance, the 
electoral system of Greece, which ‘consistently leads to highly disproportionate 
conversions of votes to seats’11, and that gives a 50 seat bonus to the first most voted for 
 
10 This substantial power in the hands of party leaders was harshly criticised by the Italian ‘5 Star Movement.’ 
Both for the 2013 and 2018 general elections, in order to mark the difference between other mainstream parties 
and itself, the ‘5 Star Movement’ held consultations with its members to choose the names of candidates to be 
put on the electoral list (s.c. parlamentarie). 
11See: Greek Report, 5. 
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party, in 2015 allowed the leftist populist party Syriza to obtain 149 seats out of 300, 
notwithstanding the fact that Syriza had obtained only the 36.3% of votes. A similar 
situation would have happened in Italy, where the idea of having a ‘clear winner’ on the 
same day of elections, inspired an electoral law which attributed 54% of seats to the 
party or coalition obtaining at least the 40% of popular vote12. Yet on the eve of the 
elections, given that polls predicted a success of the populist ‘5 Star Movement,’ the 
mainstream parties reached an agreement for a more proportional electoral law, thus 
abolishing the majority bonus. All in all, non-proportional electoral systems are at the 
two extremes of populist success—they usually prevent populist parties from obtaining 
substantive political representation; but when populists manage to gain strong popular 
support, majoritarian systems can boost their presence in national 
parliaments.Independently of the electoral system adopted, it appears that any reform 
of the electoral system should pursue at least one of these two aims. One objective is to 
enhance the proportionality of the electoral system, so as to increase the 
representativeness of the parliament as a whole. The second objective, that can be 
pursued either in combination with the first one or alone, is to allow a more direct 
identification between the elector and the representative. Such a goal can be achieved 
by reducing the size of electoral districts; but more easily by abolishing, where present, 
block lists of candidates chosen by the political parties. In light of the preceding 
observations, it cannot be surprising that Italy and Spain, the two western European 
states with the most significant presence of populist parties, have electoral systems that 
fall short of meeting these two goals, as they provide for a system of block lists and 
have very wide constituencies, 52 in Spain and only 28 in Italy (for the Chamber of 
Deputies). Just to give a term of comparison, Germany, the most populous EU Member 
State, has 299 constituencies for the national parliament. 
 
5)  Concerning the possibility of introducing imperative mandates for MPs or the institute 
of recall, the results of the research suggest to avoid recourse to these instruments. As a 
preliminary point, it is necessary to distinguish between the imperative mandate and the 
institute of recall. Recall is a mechanism through which citizens can ensure that the 
elected representative will abide by the political programme on the basis of which he/she 
has been elected. If the elected representative does not fulfil his/her promises, electors 
have the possibility to remove him/her before the end of the mandate. The imperative 
mandate, on the other hand, is an institute that, when in place, allows voters to impart 
compulsory instructions to the elected representatives. If the latter is nowhere present 
in EU Member States — with many European Constitutions explicitly prohibiting it13— 
recall is present, albeit at a national level only in Latvia (for the Parliament as a whole), 
the UK and Romania, and at sub-national level in a few more European countries, 
namely Croatia, Germany and Poland 14 . Although recall, especially if used at 
subnational level, may be considered to be beneficial in order to enhance the 
accountability of elected representatives, both instruments constitute a threat to the 
 
12For further details on the point see: Italian Report, 7-9.  
13See: Croatia, Article 74; France, Article 27; Germany, Article 38.1; Italy, Article 67; Lithuania, Article 59; Romania, 
Article 69; Spain, Article 67.2.  
14See: Croatia, Article 74; France, Article 27; Germany, Article 38.1; Italy, Article 67; Lithuania, Article 59; Romania, 
Article 69; Spain, Article 67.2.  
Copyright Castellà and Simonelli. (2019). 
15 
correct functioning of representative democracy, as they create a sentiment of distrust 
towards national parliaments. Finally, we leave open the question as to whether a 
specific form of government is best equipped to curb populism or to prevent its most 
harmful manifestations. First, because this question cannot be considered in isolation 
from the question of the best electoral system for that purpose. For instance, it is often 
considered that the presidential system creates a more pronounced polarisation both in 
politics and in the society, thus generating greater instability, whereas in parliamentary 
systems political parties have incentives to reach agreement to isolate the populists. 
However, one should not lose sight of the fact that in the former the separation of powers 
introduces effective barriers to the powers of the President and that in the second a 
governmental majority in Parliament has hardly any limit. 
 
6) with regard to the celebration of referenda it is necessary to clarify that the improvement 
of democratic quality in a State does not necessarily or primarily involve the provision 
of direct participation mechanisms. Referenda are, of course, important instruments of 
direct democracy, which enhance the democratic legitimacy of the constitutional system 
and give substance to the principle that sovereignty belongs to the people. However, 
there are strong arguments in the literature that point to the problems of referenda: their 
conflicts with the principles of representative democracy, responsible policy making, 
and the potential of manipulations by the political elite.15 Indeed, in recent years we 
have often assisted to a distorted use of referenda. As evidenced by the cases of the 
United Kingdom (Brexit), Hungary (Migrants quota) and Greece (Greek Bailout), 
Netherland (EU-Ukraine Association Agreement) referenda were not used to hear the 
people’s voice but rather to obtain a political capital to be spent against the EU. And in 
such cases, as illustrated in particular by the Greek referendum of 5 July 2015 and the 
referendum on Brexit of 23 June 2016, the result is a polarization of the society withe 
the consequential emersion of extremist positions. However, these situations may have 
been avoided by abiding to a few simple rules. Most importantly, referenda are to be 
celebrated only in the cases provided for by the Constitution and according to the rules 
of each legal system in order to avoid an abuse of the instrument. Also, the referendum 
should not be used as ordinary mechanisms of decision-making. Finally, it is worth 
considering that highly technical matters, e.g. the referendum on the Greek bailout,16 
the one held in the Netherlands on the ratification of the Association agreement between 
the EU and Ukraine,17 and the referendum on Brexit, are not suitable to be decided on 
a yes/no basis, as this precludes any meaningful debate about the issue at stake. What 
these examples clearly show is that referenda often imply an oversimplification of 
 
15 See, e.g. Hug, S. (2009). Some thoughts about referendums, representative democracy, and separation of 
powers. Constitutional Political Economy, 20(3-4), 251; Walker, M.:. The strategic use of referendums: Power, 
legitimacy, and democracy. Springer, 2003.  
16Greek voters were called upon to accept or reject the economic austerity package which had been proposed to 
Greece as a requirement to receive further financial assistance by the EU and the IMF. Every aspect of the 
referendum was contested, both at domestic and international level, but ultimately a large majority of the Greek 
population (61.3%) voted for the refusal of the austerity package, as indicated by the PM Tsipras. However, 
the latter could not keep his promises and only one week later he was forced to accept the same, if not harsher, 
austerity package, imposed by international lenders.  
17 Notwithstanding 61% of voters voted against the ratification, albeit with a turnout of only 32%, the Association 
Agreement was ultimately ratified by the Dutch parliament.  
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complex matters which may also render it impossible to respect the popular will as 
emerged from the consultation. This is why the recent proposals of the 5 Star Movement 
in Italy aimed at amending the Constitution to introduce a new form of referendum 
(Marrone 2018), and the initial proposal of Podemos in Spain to ask for a referendum, 
pursuant to Article 167 of the Spanish Constitution, on every constitutional reform, have 
to be regarded with suspicion. In conclusion, the decision as to the incorporation of new 
instruments of direct democracy must consider adequately the characteristics of each 
constitutional system in which they are going to be inserted and not as isolated or 
predominant pieces. To this regard, it is worth to trace a distinction between instruments 
of direct democracy and participative ones. The latter allow for the people’s opinion to 
be known and taken into account in governmental and parliamentarian decision-making 
through proposals received by citizens and consultations. These type of instruments, 
virtually absent in the European constitutions, being present only in the Italian and 
Portuguese ones, are becoming increasingly common at subnational and state level 
(Pettinari, 2019). The use of institutes of participative democracy, embedding the 
pluralistic principle in the decision making processes, should be promoted by 
governments as a way to restore democratic legitimacy and to reconnect citizens to 
democratic institutions. 
 
7) Finally, as regards the EU institutions, they should avoid to interfere in the domestic 
political discourse, as this may produce a backlash against the EU itself, depicted as an 
elite-driven project. To this regard, it is paradigmatic the referendum on the mandatory 
relocation of refugees held in Hungary in 2016. Conversely, the EU Institutions, should 
try to fill the democratic gap with its citizens in particular by restoring the centrality of 
the EP in European politics and by promoting the use of participatory instruments such 
as the European Citizens Initiative. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, the research work insofar carried out in the Demos project produced clarity that 
populism constitutes a threat to both the representative and constitutional dimensions of 
contemporary democracies. 
With regard to the relationship between populism and representative democracy, it can be 
observed that populism seems to enhance, at least at a first stage, democratic quality via a 
frequent recourse to institutions of direct democracy, especially referenda. Populist parties 
indeed do not seek to overcome representation as such: as a matter of fact, even populist 
governments, despite often being illiberal, remain tied to some form of electoral or plebiscitary 
legitimacy (Finchelstein 2017). However, they conceive representative democracy as the rule of 
the majority, disregarding other basic features of representative democracy, above all pluralism 
and respect for the right of the minorities. The way to respond to these phenomena is an 
enhancement of democratic quality, to be obtained, inter alia, by electoral laws that guarantee 
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a high degree of representativeness of the votes and more guarantees provided by law for the 
democratic functioning of political parties.  
As to the constitutional dimension of contemporary democracy, populism represents a threat 
that should not be underestimated. Once they reach power, populist parties tend to destroy the 
basic feature of constitutional democracy and blur the separation of powers by undermining the 
independence the judiciary, transferring substantial law-making powers to the government and 
abolishing limits to presidential mandates. The instruments available to prevent these 
phenomena of democratic erosion from arising are to be found mainly in well-designed 
constitutional revision procedures, with more rights given to the minority, and with stronger 
constitutional guarantees for judicial independence.  
Finally, as regards the EU, populist parties have exploited eurosceptics sentiments in order to 
present the European project as running against the people’s interests. To counter these attacks, 
the EU should essentially focus on reducing the distance between its institutions and the 
citizens. Another question is what legal instruments are available to the EU to react to the 
democratic erosion provoked by populist governments in EU Member States. The possibile 
answers to this question, however, will be investigated in a later stage of the project.  
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